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1. Introduction
Facing increasing demand for human uses, water resources are becoming scarcer through-
out the world. Among the institutional arrangements proposed to cope with water scarcity,
the deﬁnition and subsequent trading of water rights is usually recognized as one of the
most eﬃcient ways to manage the resource. Nevertheless, allocating water among diﬀer-
ent users often implies changes to the water cycle, and thus generates external eﬀects.
The situation is rendered even more complex in presence of coupled external eﬀects.
Understand coupled externalities as externalities rendered dependent by the underlying
biological or hydrological system, so that managing one has consequences on the others.
The aim of this paper is to explore some aspects of the complexity arising from several
coupled externalities, and to compare various water market designs to overcome this issue.
There exists in fact few papers developing formal models of water markets [7]. However
there is an abundant literature on site speciﬁc aspects of water markets, including simu-
lations and description of the institutional contexts [2]. If simulations provide optimistic
results [2], empirical analyses show more contrasted results. Tan [4] explains that authors
who have a signiﬁcant experience in water markets advocate a strong role for regulation
to impact on the scope and direction of water reallocation, in order to account for en-
vironmental externalities. In this regard, the current development of water markets for
managing water scarcity in Australia may not take suﬃciently account of environmental
issues arising from their implementation [6]. To tackle the consequences of diverting water
from natural ecosystems for human use, the necessity to cap the amount of diverted water
has been recognized early and the allocation of water made through the use of mixed
instruments, such as cap and trade. At the same time, the development of irrigation
induced negative environmental impacts (waterlogging, discharge of salty water). Oper-
ating a simpliﬁcation of the issues at stake, irrigation-induced salinity can be reduced to
a single objective to be attained : reducing the recharge to the aquifer down to a limit3
established in consistency with its hydrological characteristics. Then a satisfying manage-
ment of water resources in the southeastern states of Australia should be able to maintain
instream ﬂows and reduce the recharge to aquifers. However, due to the hydrological link-
ages existing within catchment areas, environmental ﬂows and irrigation- induced salinity
turn out to be coupled externalities.
In this paper we provide a preliminary analysis of three types of water market mechanisms
to manage water scarcity and irrigation-induced salinity. We consider two strategies for
the regulator facing two main environmental objectives concerning coupled externalities :
designing either one or two policy instruments. First, we analyze diversion rights market
constrained by catchment, so that the total amount of diversion permits allocated per zone
is consistent with the recharge constraint. Second, following Tinbergen’s [5] principle we
analyze a market for diversion rights extended to the whole system of catchments, accom-
panied by another policy instrument : either the enforcement of the recharge constraint or
the introduction of a market for recharge rights. We propose a very stylized, static, model
of irrigation-induced salinity, able to exhibit the main hydrological interactions at stake.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 develops the program of the regulator. In Section
4, we address various designs for a system of water markets to manage irrigation-induced
salinity. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The model
Consider m hydrological zones, denoted by k, located along a river and ordered upstream-
downstream. To each hydrological zone corresponds a unique watertable, which recharge
management can totally be undertaken on this zone. In each of these zones, nk agents
denoted by i ∈ [1..nk] undertake irrigation. Agent i’s utility function is :




where fi(uik) = Ai+Biuik−
Ci
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ik is the production function and p(uik,aik) = αkuik−δkaik
is the percolation function. Control variables are uik, the quantity of water applied for
irrigation, and aik, abatement decisions. αk is a percolation rate, inversely related to
the eﬃciency of irrigation technology supposed ﬁxed for an agent. δk is an index of the
eﬃciency of abatement actions : we only consider the case where abatement actions are
costly to the irrigators, and do not provide any beneﬁts apart from reduced percolation. εk
is an individual damage term associated with irrigation-induced salinity that we consider
as the eﬀect of aggregate percolation in zone k. It is a translation of soil salinization and
waterlogging in a static context. Parameters αk, δk and εk are supposed to be catchment-
speciﬁc. Indeed, their respective values depend on pedological characteristics, which are
considered more homogeneous among, than between, catchments. ρP, ρE and Caare cost
or price terms.
It is assumed that an aggregate quantity of water dk is diverted from the river at one
uptake point for each zone k, and that an amount rfk of return ﬂows goes back to the





i p(uik,aik). σk is a return-ﬂow parameter. Water available for diversion at
point k + 1 is described by the following equation:
(1) qk+1 = qk − dk + rfk
The assumption underlying these formulations is that only the actions undertaken on
point k have an impact along the segment [k,k + 1] of the river (see Figure 1). Imagine
the case of a fully regulated river : irrigation areas are provided with irrigation water di-
verted at identiﬁed uptake points along the river. Between these uptake points, water uses
are assumed to be non-consumptive. Instream-users’ interests are assumed to be accom-
modated by the regulator in deﬁning and implementing a constraint on instream ﬂows1.
Returns ﬂows have an ambiguous eﬀect on the environment. In quantitative terms, they
generate positive externalities by increasing river ﬂows. In qualitative terms, however,
1See [1] for a model with consideration of instream users5
they contribute to increasing salt concentration in river ﬂows. Stream salinity causes var-
ious types of damage : to the environment, to irrigation activities and to infrastructures.
Damage from instream salinity is expressed by : Γkrfk, Γk being the marginal damage



















Figure 1. Hydrological model
In the next section, we analyze the optimal allocation of water derived by a benevolent
regulator. In fact, it is a constrained optimal program, as some damages are not explicitly
written. Instead we deﬁne two constraints which are supposed to internalize the various
damage : a recharge constraint by zone and a constraint on environmental ﬂows.
3. The optimal allocation of water
3.1. Regulator’s objectives. The ﬁrst objective of the regulator is to guarantee a min-
imum level of instream ﬂows at each point along the river, in order to satisfy the needs
of the environment and of a range of other non -consumptive users. We call this the
environmental ﬂow constraint.
(2) qk − dk ≥ ¯ Q,∀k
This constraint imposes that a minimum ﬂow ¯ Q remains in the river after each catch-
ment’s uptake point. Indeed, considering the structure of the hydrological model, the
portion of the river between a zone’s uptake and outset points is the most vulnerable6
by respect to ﬂows. The fact that ¯ Q is the same for every catchment denotes a homo-
geneous view of the river : no particularly important ecological zones have been identiﬁed2.
The second objective of the regulator is to maintain the level of the watertable below a
critical point, above which salinization processes are enhanced. In each of the zone, the




p(uik,aik) ≤ ¯ Rk,∀k
It is assumed that both constraints are optimally set by the regulator, in order to deal with
values which are not captured by the model. If the environmental ﬂow constraint captures
non-consumptive values, the recharge constraint captures values which are inherently
dynamic and as such cannot be described by this model. In particular, this constraint
allows taking account of the dynamic externalities arising between the irrigators.
3.2. Regulator’s program. The program of the regulator, that will serve as a bench-
mark to which the next cases will be compared, is to maximise the social welfare with











subject to equations (1), (2), (3) and initial conditions. This is a general constrained
control problem, with two controls uik and aik and a state variable qk which spatial













ω(k)[qk − dk + rfk − qk+1] +
X
k
µ1(k)[qk − dk − ¯ Q] +
X
k




2This corresponds to a method of assessing environmental ﬂow needs : identify a study site illustrative
of the river, assess the environmental needs, provide recommendations under diﬀerent levels of risk. See
http://www.dpiwe.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/JMUY-5F93LC?open7
where ω(k) is the costate variable, µ1(k) and µ2(k) are the shadow costs associated with









































= ω(k) − ω(k − 1) + µ1(k) = 0












[ρP(B − Cuik) − ρE − µ1(k)] −
αk
1 − σkαk




+ σkω(k) − εk − σkΓk
(8) µ1(k) = ω(k − 1) − ω(k)
Equation (6) describes the cost ω(k) of reducing the water ﬂow between zones k and k+1
by one unit. At the equilibrium, this cost equals the marginal beneﬁt of allocating a extra
unit of water to agent ik. This beneﬁt is separated according to water use : consumption
or percolation. The ﬁrst bracketed term on the RHS of equation (6) is the net beneﬁt
of consuming a extra unit of water for agent i : the marginal beneﬁt of consuming a
extra unit of water, minus the extra cost of meeting the environmental ﬂows constraint in
zone k by diverting water. The coeﬃcient 1/1 − σkαk renders this net beneﬁt per unit of
water consumed. The second bracketed term of the RHS of equation (6) is the marginal
cost of percolating one unit of water: direct damage to user ik, extra cost of meeting
the recharge constraint and damage of an increased stream salinity downstream. The
coeﬃcient αk/1 − σkαk renders this net cost per unit of water percolated.8
Equation (7) shows the cost of meeting the recharge constraint in each zone. It is equal
to the abatement cost, Ca/δi, plus the cost of reducing the ﬂow downstream, σkω(k), plus
the beneﬁts accruing from avoided damage : individual damage, −k, and downstream
instream salinity damage, −σkΓk.
Equation (8) illustrates the path of the cost of reducing water to downstream users. It
depends on k, and not i, due to the structure of the model, with one uptake point for an
irrigation area, rather than individual riparian diverters. As µ1(k) > 0, 4ω(k) < 0. As
water goes downstream, less agents are aﬀected by individual decisions regarding diversion
or abatement [7]. As equation showed in (8), a shift of water diversion from k−1 to k+1
reduces the environmental ﬂow constraint for zone k. As we do not consider any instream
users in this model, this reduction of the environmental ﬂow constraint is the only beneﬁt
accruing from changing the location of diversion.
4. Various designs for water markets
4.1. A deﬁnition of the markets under study. The main market design we develop
in this paper is a series of cap and trades for diversion rights, each cap being deﬁned at
the catchment scale (case A). This means that a diversion cap is deﬁned for each zone,
in consistency with the recharge constraint set by the regulator. Trade is not allowed
between zones so that the status quo situation is approximated. Indeed, the current de-
velopment of water markets in Australia is such that one can consider that barriers to
trade prevent trade between zones, except a few exceptions3. Case A is an example of the
design of a single instrument to manage two objectives. Then we present two diﬀerent
types of market designs, both allowing trade of diversion rights within the whole system
of m catchments, and making use of two instruments to manage two objectives. In case
B, it is supposed that the regulators seeks to have the recharge objective attained through
the enforcement of the coupling constraint equation (3). In case C, we consider that this
3Note that currently caps are deﬁned in consistency with a scarcity constraint, not a recharge one.9
constraint is managed through the use of a market for tradeable recharge rights on each
zone. Such a market has been proposed by Whitten et al. [8], but not formally analyzed.
In the case of a basin-wide market, the regulator issues a total amount ¯ W of diversion






ik is the initial allocation of agent i from
zone k. The amount of permits bought (resp. sold) by agent ik from (resp. to) agent j
from zone h is w
jh
ik (resp. wik













The amount of permits bought by ik depends on the price of the permits : p
jh
ik. It is also
the reservation price at which ik is willing to sell his permits.
In the case of a series of markets constrained by zones, the regulator issues a total
number of permits ¯ Wk in each hydrological zone, so that ¯ Wk =
P
i w0
ik. Agents cannot buy
or sell permits outside their hydrological zone. It is thus imposed that wik
jh = 0, ∀j 6= k.











Recharge markets are, by construction, constrained by zone. Indeed, the cap (the maxi-
mum amount of percolated water to be produced) is deﬁned according to each watertable’s
characteristics, and corresponds to conditions on the stationarity of the watertable. Hence
the regulator issues a maximum amount of recharge permits, ¯ Rk, for each zone in consis-











The analyses presented in the remainder of this paper are undertaken according to the
constraints and deﬁnitions given in the following table.10
Nature of the rights Compliance constraint Market clearing conditions
Case A : Zonal cap and trades on diversion
P
i w0
ik = ¯ Wk = f( ¯ Rk) uik = wik
P
i(wik − w0
ik) = 0 ∗
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ik) = 0 ]
P
i r0
ik = ¯ Rk p(uik,aik) = rik
P
i(rik − r0
ik) = 0 ∗
] intra and inter zone trading ∗ intra zone trading only
Next, we analyze case A, and derive the conditions for this market design to be optimal.
We show that it is highly improbable that these conditions are met. Then we address
cases B and C by pointing two interesting preliminary results.
4.2. A series of zonal cap and trades for diversion. In this case, we assume that
the regulator computes the zonal caps for diversion ¯ Wk in consistency with the recharge
constraint equation (3). Irrigators only account for the instream ﬂow constraint (2).
Furthermore, if they account for the state variable, equation (12), they do not use it in
their decision making program, as they cannot trade with upstream or downstream users.
Proposition 1. A Nash Equilibrium exists for a given diversion rights price.
Proof. It can be veriﬁed that agents’ strategies uik and aik are selected from a convex,
closed and bounded sets. Furthermore the utility function is continuous and concave in
each control. Then from Theorem 1 from Rosen [3] we know that this game admits an
equilibrium point. 
Note that the unicity of the equilibrium point is not a priori assured in reason of the
coupling constraint equation (2) [3].11
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium to the diversion rights market in zone k when
∀i,j ∈ [1..nk] we have ∂Bi/∂uik − ηik
1 = ∂Bj/∂uik − η
jk
1 .










ik subject to w(ik) − uik = 0.












1 [qk − dk − ¯ Q] + β
ik
























ik + βik = 0.
From these equations, we get the payoﬀ from buying a diversion permit, which is set
equal to the marginal beneﬁt of using this permit minus the market price. A decision
to buy a permit will be made according to this relation. An agent i will buy a permit
from an agent j as long as : ∂Bi/∂uik − ηik
1 − p
jk
ik > 0. The opportunity cost of a
permit equals the marginal beneﬁt from using it, so that the payoﬀ, for jk, from selling
a permit to ik is : pik
jk − [∂Bj/∂uik − η
jk
1 ]. Agent jk will have an incentive to sell a
permit as long as the payoﬀ is positive. Hence, if ∂Bj/∂uik − η
jk






1 ] will induce a transfer of rights from jk to ik. In the
same manner, if ∂Bj/∂uik−η
jk
1 > ∂Bi/∂uik−ηik






will induce a transfer from ik to jk. Only when the marginal beneﬁts are equal there is
no incentive to trade. 
Proposition 3. This system of markets for diversion rights leads to the optimal allocation
of water only under highly restrictive conditions.12










Equations (10) and (5) are compatible if :
σk[Γk − ω(k)] + µ
k
2 = 0.
If the recharge constraint is non binding, µk
2 = 0 which implies Γk = ω(k). This means
that the equalization of the ﬁrst-order conditions on the choice of the level of abatement
forces Γk to equal ω(k). Interestingly, the term σk[ω(k) − Γk] measures the diﬀerence
of importance between quantitative and qualitative impacts of discharges from the wa-
tertable. Its sign reﬂects the relative importance of social beneﬁts due to increased water
ﬂowing downstream of zone k compared to the social cost of increased instream salinity
generated by k. Only when the social beneﬁts from discharging balance the associated
social costs do individual agents perform optimally by respect to abatement choice. If
the recharge constraint is binding, then compatibility with the optimal solution requires
that µk
2 = σk[ω(k)−Γk]. The cost of respecting the recharge constraint has to be equal to
the net social beneﬁts from reducing the recharge to the aquifer. In both cases, the ﬁrst
order conditions on the choice of the level of irrigation become : p
jk
ik + ηik
1 = ω(k) + µk
1.
If there exists a mechanism that induces individual agents to account for a shadow cost
of the coupling constraint on environmental ﬂows just equal to the optimal shadow cost,
then p
jk
ik = ω(k). The optimal price per zone is then just equal to the co-state variable
derived in the optimal case. 
With this system agents are not directly induced to abate more that what is individually
optimal (balancing the avoided individual damage and the cost of abating). Note that, if
these conditions are met, a series of markets for diversion rights as deﬁned above would
ensure that the optimal solution is met if the zonal caps ¯ Wk are deﬁned as follows, where
a∗ is the optimal abatement decision : ¯ Wk = 1/αk[ ¯ Rk + δk
P
j a∗].13
4.3. Basin-wide cap and trades for diversion. In this section, we present preliminary
results related to cases B and C. Their analysis is rendered more complex in reason of the
possibility for agents to trade with agents from other hydrological zones. This implies an
asymmetry of trade according to the location of the trading partner [7]. The resolution
process is the same as in the previous case. The existence of an equilibrium is assured
due to the concavity of the game, but there may be a problem of multiplicity of equilibria
due to the presence of the coupling constraints equations (2) and (3). The demonstration
of the existence of the market equilibria is in progress and not developed here. First,
we develop the asymmetries of trade between zones. Second, we show the impact of a
recharge rights market on the functioning of the diversion rights market.
An upstream/downstream asymmetry of trade. Following Weber [7], we derive a
series of expressions from the structure of the model that allow to illustrate the impact
of trades on water ﬂowing down the river. Considering the constraints accounting for by
individual agents, in particular the environmental ﬂow constraint (2), an agent perceives
the river ﬂow reaching his zone as follows :







This means that an agent knows that the amount of water available for diversion in his
zone depends on the actions undertaken by upstream users. In cases B and C users can
trade with any user in any zone, they can assess the impact of their trading decisions on
the water that will reach their zones. Note that trades with users located downstream or
in the same zone (h ≥ k) do not have any consequence on water available for diversion in
zone k, as the summation stops at k − 1.
We have : ∂w(ik)/∂w
jh
ik = 1 and ∂w(ik)/∂wik
jh = −1. Any purchase by agent ik translates
into an increase of his ﬁnal holding; inversely, any sale by agent ik means a decrease of its
ﬁnal holding. We also have that : ∂w(ik)/∂w(jh) ≤ 0. Any increase in ik’s ﬁnal holding14
means a transfer from another user, whose ﬁnal holding decreases consequently. And
inversely. From the deﬁnitions of diversions and return ﬂows, we have : ∂dh/∂wik
jh = 1,
∂rfh/∂wik
jh = σkαk. A purchase of permits by agent jh allows him to use more water,
increasing diversions to his zone, as well as return ﬂows from his zone. Then trades with










= 1 − σhαh ≥ 0
When agent ik purchases a permit from an upstream agent jh, he allows more water
to reach his zone, as agent jh does not divert the corresponding amount of water. The
counterpart is that agent jh does not produce the corresponding return ﬂows. The net








= σhαh − 1 ≤ 0
When agent ik sells a permit to an upstream agent jh, more water is diverted upstream,
and return ﬂows are generated. The net result is negative. The impact of total trades

















Consequently, agent ik’s trade decisions have an indirect impact on qk and thus on the
value of the instream ﬂow constraint. His trading decisions can make it more or less
binding. Hence there is an asymmetry of trade according to the location of the trading
partner along the river.
Impact of the recharge market on the diversion market. We consider the ﬁrst-




















subject to w(ik) − uik = 0 and r(ik) − p(uik,aik) = 0, to equation (2), and with (12).


























From (14), two remarks can be made. First, as addressed in the previous point, the
price for diversion rights depends on the location of the trading partners, through the
term ∂qk/∂uik. Second, this price also depends negatively on the equilibrium price for
recharge rights, ρ
j
i. Such a system of two markets implicitly constrains one market by the
other. Indeed, making use of a diversion permit requires that one holds a permit for the
associated recharge, so that the market are coupled.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a preliminary analysis of diﬀerent market designs to manage coupled
externalities. In order to attain two coupled objectives, the management of the recharge
of a series of aquifers and the management of water scarcity in the surface system, we con-
sider three types of market designs. The resolution process is rendered diﬃcult due to the
fact that the environmental constraints set by the regulator are coupling constraints, so
that there is an issue of multiple equilibria. We provide the full resolution for a case where
the two objectives are accomodated with a unique instrument, a series of cap and trades
deﬁned at the hydrological zone level. This instrument does not prove able to support the
optimal solution, or only under highly restrictive conditions, mainly due to the fact that
there is no explicit incentive to abate. We also address a couple of preliminary results
from the other cases, where the regulator deﬁnes two policy instruments to attain two ob-
jectives. First, we put in perspective the presence of asymmetries in trades, according to
the location of the trading partners. Indeed, an agent trading with an upstream user has
a direct inﬂuence on the water available for diversion in his zone. This has consequences16
on the characterization of the market equilibrium, in progress and therefore not presented
here. Second, we show how a market for recharge rights potentially constrains the market
for diversion rights. This results in a form of environmentally-driven constraint on water
trade. Our analysis bears some limitations. First,we do not allow evolving irrigation tech-
nology. This would have consequences by introducing a more stringent tradeoﬀ between
reducing the amount of water applied for irrigation, and investing in a more eﬃcient tech-
nology. Second, we consider a static setting, which means that we cannot fully account
for the essentially dynamic nature of groundwater. The next step on our research agenda
is to develop a dynamic model of this context.
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